The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the "hired for" doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for cofinancing arrangements in research activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
A feature common to the patent race and the endogenous growth literatures is their simplified representation of R&D activities, which are assumed to be performed by an aggregate agent playing simultaneously the roles of financier, creator, owner, and (often) user of the innovation. In practice, however, R&D takes place either within firms where employees-inventors are subject to assignment contracts with their employers or through contractual agreements between independent research units and users of their innovations or financiers. In both cases, the contractual provisions on how to finance the research activities, how to allocate control over the R&D process, how to share property rights on innovations, and on how to structure the monetary compensations to the inventors' are far more complex than the current aggregated view of the R&D process suggests.
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1. The sharing of return streams need not covary perfectly with property rights. For example, property rights may go to the employee in universities and to the employer in aircraft manufacturers even though the sharing rules are similar (for instance, the four largest U. S. aircraft manufacturers offer their employees shares of 10 percent to 30 percent on income collected from royalties [Neumeyer 1971 organizational point of view. First, it studies how the allocation of property rights on innovations can affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations when their exact nature cannot be contracted upon ex ante. Second, it rationalizes a number of common contracting and legal features of the organization of R&D. Third, it sheds light on the findings of the empirical R&D literature and discusses the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian [1942] hypotheses on the effects of an increase in the scale, scope, monopoly power, or "long-purse" enjoyed by the user of an innovation on R&D inputs and outputs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II analyzes the basic contractual relationship between a research unit and a customer. Customers are those parties who directly benefit from the innovation; namely, the manufacturers who commercialize the innovation, the users who will purchase the resulting product, and the suppliers of complementary products or of inputs used by the manufacturer. (Which of these three kinds of customer finances the innovation depends on the industry [von Hippel 1988] , in particular on who benefits most from the innovation. For the purpose of this paper, we can content ourselves with a single aggregated customer.) The research unit, which may or may not belong to the same firm as the customer, performs the creative task but has no independent resource to pay for salaries, equipment, or data. It must therefore look for outside financing. In a first step, we assume that the financing is provided by the customer.
We posit that the exact nature of the innovation is ill-defined ex ante and that the two parties cannot contract for delivery of a specific innovation. The contract (realistically) specifies a verifiable amount of customer investment, the allocation of property rights on any forthcoming innovation, and possibly, a sharing rule on the profit (license fee) obtained by the research unit.
In the integrated case the customer owns and freely uses the innovation. In the nonintegrated case the research unit owns the innovation and, once the innovation is made, bargains with the customer over the license fee. The sharing rule contracted upon ex ante is shown to be irrelevant. The study then boils down to the classic one of choosing property rights so as to best protect the two parties' specific investments in the relationship. Giving property rights to the research unit is optimal when it is more important to encourage the unit's effort to discover than to boost the customer's financial (and nonfinancial) investment in the research. In addition to this Grossman and Hart-like conclusion, the existence of a cash constraint on the research unit's side accounts for a possible inefficiency of the allocation of property rights when the customer ex ante has substantial bargaining power.
Is it optimal to have a single provider of funds, namely the customer? Extending further the property rights model of Grossman and Hart by allowing for equity participation by the customer as well as by third parties (investors), we show in subsection II.4 that it may be strictly optimal for the customer to give property rights to the research unit and to demand cofinancing by an investor (such as a venture capitalist, a bank, or a parent company not in the customer's business). Furthermore, such a cofinancing cannot be duplicated by transferring the investor's share in the research unit to the customer, since the customer then faces conflicting objectives when bargaining with the research unit. We thus obtain a theory of the existence of multiple principals.
Our framework also provides a rigorous evaluation of the Schumpeterian hypotheses (subsection I.5). It questions the robustness of the Schumpeterian conjectures mentioned earlier to variations in the allocation of property rights on innovation. Once this allocation is endogenized as part of the contractual arrangements between customers and research units, one should not expect a clear empirical aggregate relationship between R&D input or output and parameters such as scale, scope, or monopoly power.
More complicated allocations of property rights commonly observed in research employment contracts include (see Neumeyer [1971] ) (a) property rights contingent on the nature of the innovation (which, for instance, confer ownership to the customeremployer for inventions that are "related" to the employer's business or make use of the employer's facilities or data, and to the researcher-employee for inventions that pertain to other businesses); (b) trailer clauses (which confer ownership to the customer-employer for innovations made by a breakaway researcher-employee shortly after quitting the firm and to the researcher-employee otherwise); (c) shop rights (which confer ownership to the researcher-employee while at the same time allocating a nonexclusive, nonassignable, and royalty-free license to use the innovation to the employer). Shop rights, property rights contingent on the nature of the innovation, and rules governing breakaway research are instances of multiple, split property rights. Section III rationalizes these institutions by extending the basic framework of Section II in order to account for the possibility of multiple innovations or the existence of multiple customers for the same innovation.
Section IV analyzes the relationship between the organization of research and the size of the resulting innovations. In particular, it questions the validity of the common claim that independent research units have more incentives to pursue radical innovations than the research division of a customer. Last, Section V summarizes the main insights of the paper, and discusses some directions for research.
II. THE BAsIc FRAMEWORK

I.1. Research Technology
A research unit (RU) performs research for a customer (C). The value of innovation for the customer is V > 0. The probability of discovery, p (e,E), depends on the noncontractible effort cost e by RU and on the investment E by C. The probability is increasing and strictly concave in (e,E). We will also assume thatp (e,E) < 1 in the relevant range and that the marginal productivities of effort and investment at their zero level are infinite so as to guarantee interior solutions (for strictly positive incentives). The minimum level of effort of the research unit, that is, the level of effort induced by its researchers' intellectual curiosity, ego, career concerns, and prospects of informal rewards, is normalized to be 0. So is the minimum level of investment by the customer. We will make two opposite assumptions concerning the customer's investment. In the first case E is monetary and contractible. In the second case E stands for proprietary technological information freely supplied to the research unit, or for interaction with the research unit to tailor the innovation to the final demand; E will then be assumed to be noncontractible. We would of course expect a mixture of contractible and noncontractible investments in reality. The results for the two cases are most often identical, and so we will state the results with both cases in mind, unless they differ, in which case we will note the points of departure.
Without loss of insights, we posit a separable form for the technology: p(e,E) = q(e) + r(E). Our theory can be straightforwardly extended to nonseparable technologies. The new feature is then that the optimal specification of the customer's investment (if it is contractible) reflects its influence on the research unit's effort through complementarities or substitutabilities in the production function. Both parties are income risk neutral and have reservation utility 0. Furthermore, and this is our first basic assumption, RU has no initial cash endowment, and its income cannot be negative.
Let us define the socially optimal (or first-best) effort and investment e*(V) and E*(V) by max {p(e,E)V -e -El, or q'(e*(V)) V = r'(E * (V))V = 1.
Contracts
A natural way of introducing property rights considerations in the analysis of R&D activities is by postulating the incompleteness of research contracts. More specifically, and this is our second basic assumption, we posit that the exact nature of the innovation is ill defined ex ante, so that the two parties cannot contract for delivery of a specific innovation. The contract only specifies the allocation of the property right on any forthcoming innovation, a sharing rule on the verifiable revenue (license fee) obtained by the research unit, and any verifiable amount of customer investment.2 The realized value of the innovation for the customer is noncontractible; that is, either it is a private benefit (it reduces the customer's productive effort, say), or it is a monetary benefit that cannot be recovered among the customer's many activities. (Assuming that this value is contractible would not affect the analysis in the absence of third parties.)
If property rights on the innovation are allocated to C, then C can freely use the innovation. In that case RU receives no reward for innovating.3 This we shall refer to as C-ownership or integrated case.
If RU owns the innovation, C and RU bargain over the licensing fee once the innovation has been made. This we call 2. Allowing for announcement games between the two contracting parties after the realization of the state of nature (i.e., after the innovation has either occurred or not occurred) need not destroy the property rights interpretation developed in the paper. In particular, one can show that, in the context of this basic two-party contracting model, the optimal complete contract can be implemented by a random allocation of property rights between RU and C, provided that we allow for ex post renegotiation after the innovation has occurred. This result, however, in general is not robust to the introduction of third (cofinancing) parties, unless we preclude any net transfer from the principal to such parties in the state of nature where no innovation occurs.
3. To be certain, there exists some noncontractual or informal sharing in that firms reward successful researchers ex post through salary increases, cash awards, fringe benefits, stocks, or promotions. Such rewards are generally not commensurate with the value of the innovation [Neumeyer 1971 RU-ownership or nonintegrated case. (So we assume that C is the only user of the innovation and is therefore indispensable for the realization of the value of innovation. This assumption is relaxed in Sections III and IV.) For simplicity, we assume that the total pie V is then equally split ex post between the owner RU and the customer C, so that C pays a license fee equal to V/2.4 REMARK. By focusing on ownership of the innovation, we have ignored the possibility of RU owning C. Suppose thus that C is a division owned by RU. We will then assume that ownership of C does not imply that R U can force C to produce and that C's indispensability in the production process allows it to extract V/2 from RU by threatening not to produce.5 RU then gains nothing from owning C instead of only the innovation, and our focus on the ownership of innovation involves no loss of generality. Alternatively, we could invoke RU's cash constraint to rule out its owning C.
I1.3. Who Should Own the Innovation?
This subsection assumes away the possibility of C's equity holding in RU (see subsection II.4 below). Whether C or RU should own the innovation hinges on two basic considerations: (a) the marginal efficiency of RU's effort compared with the marginal efficiency of C's investment; (b) the ex ante bargaining power of the two parties (who proposes the initial contract), which reflects the extent to which the research unit is the only candidate to perform the research. The importance of ex ante bargaining assumptions follows from utility not always being ex ante transferable between RU and C. More specifically, the cash-constrained RU is unable to compensate C for a transfer of ownership to RU, even if such a transfer results in a higher total surplus (pV -e -E).
Consider first C-ownership. RU then receives no reward for innovating and therefore supplies no effort: e = 0. On the other 5. This is in the spirit of Hart and Moore [1994] . Our assumption may be weaker than the one made in Hart and Moore where parties are bound by a complete contract. Here, unlike in Hart and Moore, the nature of production is ex ante ill defined and cannot be described in a contract. Note also that we do not make a similar assumption for RU (although we could). We rather assume that RU cannot promise (contract on) the innovation before it is made. 
hand, C has appropriate incentives to invest. It maximizes [p(O,E)V -E] and therefore chooses E = E*(V)
.
II.4. The Irrelevance of C's Equity in RU and the Rationale for Cofinancing
Parties who do not directly benefit from the innovation, namely banks, venture capitalists, or a parent company often contribute to the financing of the research unit. To explain this, we must come to grips with the issue of what such investors do that customers could not do themselves; that is, why cannot customers themselves provide cash to the research unit in exchange for equity shares in RU? The answer to this question turns out to be quite simple and relies on the following irrelevance argument. . (A similar reasoning shows that RU's being given a share in C has no effect on the net license fee and is therefore irrelevant.)
This irrelevance result generalizes to nonlinear sharing rules as long as the two parties can by mutual consent tear up the initial contract and renegotiate. The initial sharing rule cannot influence the ex post bargaining game between RU and C since in contrast to some other incomplete contracts models with renegotiation,9 the object (innovation) to be traded ex post is not ex ante contractible.
In contrast with the above irrelevance result, introducing third parties (outside investors) as co-owners of RU can help raise C's profit under RU ownership and hence may occur if C has substantial bargaining power ex ante.
Suppose therefore that C has the ex ante bargaining power. Assume further that investment is contractible (this is not crucial for the argument). C can then demand cofinancing E1 in exchange for a claim of a fraction (1 -a) of R U's profits. As before, RU and C bargain over the licensing fee after the innovation occurs and C must still pay an observable license fee equal to V/2 to RU's owners. However the researchers themselves now receive a return of aV/2 for the innovation, whereas the outside investors receive (1 -a)V/2. Note that in the bargaining process the investors and the research unit have congruent interests, namely to extract as much from the customer as is possible; therefore the investors have no incentive to enter the bargaining process, to collude with 8. We do not wish to imply that customers should never take equity in the independent research units they sponsor. Equity participation here does not raise the customer's investment since it has no effect on the real transfer price. But it could affect other moral hazard components of the customer's activity. For instance, in the presence of alternative customers (see subsection III.3), if there were appropriability problems so that the customer could resell the technology to other customers, an equity participation in the research unit would mitigate the customer's incentive to expropriate the research unit [Rodriguez 1992 where E = Ec +E1 is total investment. The optimal total investment for the customer is E = E*((1 -a/2)V). Cofinancing thus allows the customer to give the research unit any fraction of the value of the innovation between 0 (C-ownership) and 1/2 (pure RU-ownership). With contractible, perfectly substitutable investments, cofinancing transforms a discrete choice of governance structure into a continuous one." Note that our argument relies on the license fee being verifiable. For, the customer and the research unit would have an incentive to collude against the third party by specifying a small fee and making an additional transfer on the side. In view of the 10. The lack of incentive to collude comes from the linear sharing rule. The corporate finance literature has demonstrated that, in the absence of renegotiation or collusion, a nonlinear contract between an investor and an agent, such as a debt contract, can" strengthen the agent's bargaining position with a third party. Nonlinear contracts, on the other hand, are sensitive to the possibility of secret renegotiation between the investor and the agent. Indeed if the research unit and the customer bargain together, it is optimal for the research unit and the investor to secretly renegotiate toward a linear sharing rule so as to obtain congruence.
We should also point out that our analysis carries over to the situation where the investor is drawn into the bargaining process (indeed in a generalization of the alternative-move model with short periods, the research unit's payoff, aV/2, is not affected by this possibility: see our discussion paper).
11 prevalence of shareholdings by outside shareholders or headquarters in the real world, we do not find the verifiability assumption unrealistic, although the collusion argument indicates one possible limit in cases where the customer and the research unit have the opportunity to make large hidden side transfers.
The choice of a is based on two considerations. First, a lower a allows cofinancing and thus reduces the customer's investment burden. Second, the dilution of RU's share reduces its incentives and therefore the probability of discovery. Using RU's first-order condition (q'(e*(aV/2))aV/2 = 1), the derivative of C's profit with respect to a is equal to [-pV/2 + [(2 -a)/a2](-q'/q")]. The first term in this derivative is the rent extraction effect, and the second the incentive effect. That a = 0 is never optimal implies that C-ownership is not optimal either.12 Pure customer financing (a = 1) may or may not be optimal depending on the size of the incentive effect. If effort is quite sensitive to dilution (that is, if -q"/q' is small), then a = 1 is indeed optimal. But if effort is relatively inelastic, the rent extraction effect dominates and cofinancing occurs. The amount of investor financing for the optimal at* is then given by13 (= p( e* ) E*((1 -) V))(1 -at*) -
II.5. Schumpeterian Hypotheses
The second most tested set of hypotheses in industrial organization (after the cross-sectional analysis of the structure-conductperformance paradigm) relates R&D input (R&D expenditures or personnel engaged in R&D) or output (as measured by the number of "significant" innovations) to variables that presumably alter the incentives for R&D. The scale effect states somewhat vaguely that a "larger" firm has more incentives for R&D. A first interpretation of this scale effect is that a larger market for a good that benefits from a process innovation raises the value of the innovation. The 12. However, C-ownership can again become optimal when the customer sinks noncontractible investment such as advice on design or release of proprietary technological information. Then C-ownership cannot be duplicated by RU-ownership with cofinancing at a = 0 if E, and EC are not perfect substitutes in the production function. A move to RU-ownership reduces the customer's investment, and this investment cannot be perfectly offset by an increase in the investor's financing.
13. Not requiring any transfer from the investor is optimal as long as E*, < E*((l-a*/2)V). If this inequality is not satisfied, one optimal policy for the customer is to let the investor finance the whole investment E*((1 -ot*/2)V) and ask for a transfer a, = E,* -E*((1 -ot*/2)V). relevant explanatory variable is then the size of the business unit rather than the size of the firm. An alternative view takes the size of the firm as the relevant empirical variable. Relatedly, the scope effect (Nelson [1959] ) posits that a more diversified firm exploits innovations more easily than a specialized firm and "therefore" has more incentives to innovate. The market power effect presumes that firms with market power gain more from an innovation. How do these hypotheses fit in our framework? Let us assume that the scale, scope, and market power effect all boil down to a change in V. (See Aghion and Tirole [1993] for a brief discussion of this.) First, one can study how R&D inputs and output react to an increase in the value of innovation, taking the organizational form as given (in the case of cofinancing, the investor's share in the research unit is kept fixed). It is easily shown that effort, investment, and probability of discovery all increase with V.14 However, these monotonicity results may not hold any longer once the organizational form or ownership structure of R&D activities is endogenized. For, as the value of innovation increases, C may either insist on keeping or acquiring property rights (it becomes even more important for the customer to fully capture the whole value of innovation) or instead want to voluntarily relinquish property rights to RU (it also becomes more important to raise the research unit's incentives through RU-ownership). The Appendix illustrates this trade-off with two simple examples, one where RU's effort contributes proportionally more to the probability of discovery than C's investment as V increases, and a (polar) example where C's investment becomes relatively more important as V increases.
Consider now a switch from C-ownership to RU-ownership. The standard R&D input measure, the customer's monetary investment, declines. The output measure, here the probability of discovery, on the other hand, may well increase due to improved incentives of the research unit. Input and output measures then move in opposite directions because part of the input cannot be measured.15 Furthermore, there is no clear relationship between either measure and the value of the innovation and therefore the Schumpeterian parameters. 
Indeed, under C-ownership, E = E*(V), andp = r(E*(V)) with dE*/dV
II.6. The Long-Purse Effect
Our analysis so far has assumed away the existence of cash or credit constraints on the customer's side. Introducing such constraints into our framework has obvious implications for the optimal ownership structure.
Consider, for instance, the situation where C-ownership is optimal provided that the customer can finance E*(V) without going on the capital market and assume now that the customer has less than E*((V) and must borrow in a market that is imperfect for informational reasons.16 External financing is then more costly than internal financing and a move from C-ownership to RUownership may become attractive since it reduces the customer's benchmark (monetary) investment from E*(V) to E*(V/2), and thus reduces the amount of cash C needs to borrow on the capital market. Financial constraints therefore bias the organizational form toward the use of creative inputs and away from capital expenditures. An interesting implication of this analysis is the prediction that new firms or firms which have experienced hard times will tend to farm out their research activities more than established, healthy firms. This is nothing but a refinement of the well-known "long-purse" hypothesis enunciated by Schumpeter, according to which a firm's R&D investment should be positively correlated with its assets.
III. SPLIT PROPERTY RIGHTS
We have analyzed the allocation of a single property right. In practice, the innovation may have more than one customer, or there may be more that one innovation. There is then more than one property right to allocate, and property rights can be, and often are, split.
III. 1. Multiple Innovations: Contingent Property Rights and the "Hired for" Doctrine
We observed in the introduction that both employment contracts and the law allocate property rights on the basis of how much customer investment was used by the research unit and of whether the research unit had been hired for the innovation and 16. In our working paper we modeled this credit market imperfection as a costly state verification problem. But alternative modeling choices could have been made without impacting on our basic point. made it during normal working hours. We argue that these contingent property rights stem from incentive considerations.
Coming back to the single-customer case, suppose that the effort e and the investment E can yield one in a subset T C _ + of types of innovation. With probability Xt, with EteT Xt = 1, innovation t, with value Vt, is the relevant one. Some types of innovation are consumed by the customer, some others are purchased at price Vt by alternative customers (so, the "customer" can be both a customer and an investor in our terminology). Besides their value, types of innovation differ in the extent they make use of the customer's investment. Namely, we assume that the probability of discovery conditional on innovation t being the relevant one is p(e,E,t) = q(e) + tr(E). We also assume that e and E are chosen before the parties known which innovation is relevant.17 Let at denote RU's share of the value of the innovation of type t. Note that the nature of innovation is contractible. Because both parties never have an incentive to overinvest (their individual stakes. never exceed Ytxt Vt), an optimal contract must maximize the stake of either party in the innovation given the other party's stake.'8 We therefore maximize C's incentive subject to RU's incentive exceeding some level: The optimal policy is thus very similar to the contingent splits described in the Introduction. If the innovation makes much use (respectively, little use) of the customer's investment, the customer (respectively, the research unit) owns the innovation. In the middle case, they split the benefit Vto. This analysis rationalizes not only the usual contingent split of property rights but also the "hired for" doctrine. Presumably, the innovations for which the employee is hired make more use of the employer's investment and therefore should be owned by the employer.
A caveat is that our assumption of a single effort has swept aside a potential inefficiency in the allocation of effort created by contingent property rights. If not monitored, the agent has an incentive to devote excessive attention to those potential innovations with the highest at. Such effort allocation raises the desirability of uniform property rights.19 (A similar point applies to noncontractible investment by the customer.) This caveat rationalizes the distinctions made between research done at home and at work. Presumably the employer can better monitor the effort allocation when the employee is at work. In this program aol is indeterminate, as both incentives depend only on RU's total share (aotVi + ac2V2 ). However, when Cl's investment affects not only the probability of discovery, but also its own valuation V1 for the innovation (E ? 0), the optimal contract must give maximal incentives to C1 on its own use of the innovation. In particular, ao = 0 if ot2 < 1. In words, if C1 can affect V1 but not V2, its relative share should be tilted as much as possible toward the first use. Indeed, if the optimal stake for the research unit, V*Ru, does not exceed V2, the optimal contract gives a shop right to C1 and allocates the licensing fees in proportions a* V* /V2 to RU and 1 -2a* to C1. We thus obtain a rationale for shop rights.22
III.2. Multiple Innovations: Sequential Property
We summarize Section III with the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. In the presence of multiple users or multiple innovations, the property rights may be split between the customer and the research unit. Each should get property rights on those activities for which it has a comparative advantage in creating value. This principle gives rise to shop rights, property rights based on the nature or the date of the innovation and to the "hired for" doctrine.
22. When Vku > V2, a shop right does not enable R U to appropriate enough of the innovation. Other contracts (possibly including cofinancing) must then be used.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE SIZE OF INNOVATIONS
This section investigates the relationship between property rights and the nature of the innovation: does an independent research unit have more incentives to pursue radical (drastic) versus incremental (nondrastic) innovations compared with the same research unit within an integrated firm?
A main motivation for analyzing this question is derived from the recent "neo-Schumpeterian" literature on endogenous technical change and the process of economic growth. This literature, and particularly the models with vertical innovations or "quality ladders," expresses the long-run rate of productivity growth as a function of both the frequency and the size of innovations.23 Another motivation is Henderson [1991] 's tests of the hypothesis that established firms would pursue incremental rather than radical innovations (tests which yielded mixed results).
In the previous sections we concentrated our analysis on the relationship between the organizational form of research and the frequency of innovations. Our emphasis in this section is on the relationship between the organization of research and the size (or drasticity) of technological or quality improvement brought about by the innovation.
More precisely, we consider a single innovation and assume that the probability of discovery decreases with the size of the innovation. To focus on the choice of technology, we ignore in a first step the inputs e and E in the notation and denote the probability of discovery by p (,y). The parameter y ? 1 indexes the "size of the innovation" or "research line," with y = 1 corresponding to the existing technology. What was previously said about inputs still applies and of course influences the distribution of property rights.
Following the patent race literature, we refer to the current customer C as the "incumbent" and to other potential customers as "entrants. 1 as c decreases (,y increases) . In a homogeneous good industry, an independent research unit will pursue less drastic innovations than an integrated one. On the other hand, our working paper [1993] analyzes two other standard models of industry behavior, respectively, with horizontal and vertical product differentiation, that yield ambiguous conclusions as to the monotonicity of the appropriability ratio. There is therefore no general conclusion about the impact of the ownership structure on the size of innovations.
V. SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Managing innovation properly is one of the most important challenges faced by developed economies. This exploratory paper argues that property rights analysis offers a conceptual framework to understand the organizational aspects of R&D activities and the innovation is minor, and conversely when the innovation is drastic. On the one hand, the replacement effect implies that the incumbent is not in a hurry to innovate. On the other hand, competition destroys industry profit and therefore the incumbent gains more from remaining a monopoly than an entrant from becoming a duopolist. The latter efficiency effect is absent here, since the research unit sells to the incumbent anyway. Our analysis, which also hinges on the willingess to innovate of the incumbent and the entrant, has a very different focus, namely the choice of research technology for a single research unit rather than the race between two research units with fixed research technologies. their implications in terms of the frequency and size of innovations. Let us summarize our main insights. First, research will more likely be conducted in an integrated structure if (a) capital inputs are substantial relative to intellectual inputs-in contrast, when intellectual inputs dominate as for software and biotechnology, research will often be performed by independent units; (b) the customer has more bargaining power ex ante, say because of intense competition among potential research teams; (c) the customer has a deep pocket. Otherwise, research activities are more likely to be performed by nonintegrated research units. In that case, cofinancing by an outside investor (venture capitalist or bank) may benefit the customer of the innovation. Second, when there are multiple innovations or multiple customers, property rights must be split on the basis of comparative advantage in creating value. This principle gives rise to shop rights, the "hired for" doctrine, and trailer clauses. Third, the drasticity or size of innovations is also affected by the organization of research. However, to predict whether an independent research unit wants to pursue more drastic innovations than an integrated one requires detailed knowledge of the industry, and in particular of the appropriability ratio.
The potential of the property rights analysis for studying innovation management is broader than is suggested by the limited scope of this paper.
First, except in our brief discussion of breakaway research in Section III, we have focused on the static management of innovation. However, the dynamic aspects of the organization of research activities are also important, and in particular they underlie the (business economics) debate on the relative merits and drawbacks of "vertical" Research Joint Ventures (RJV)27 vis-&-vis (permanently) integrated structures (or direct equity participations). RJVs have specific objectives and are generally limited in scope or in time. The short-term horizon of the RJV matters when the research unit cannot protect its intellectual property. By releasing its technological knowledge to its partner, the research unit raises 27. Such RJVs involve independent researchers (or inventors) and manufacturing firms (developers), where the former contribute their knowledge and the latter contribute capital or other productive inputs. These are to be distinguished from "horizontal" RJVs, where several customers competing or not in a product market join forces to finance research (see Brodley 1982) . The study of horizontal RJVs also raises a host of fascinating issues concerning free riding, the allocation among customers of ownership rights as well as control rights over the research process, and antitrust policy. the probability of success of the joint venture, but also creates its own competition in the future. RJVs are thus not very conducive to technology transfers, although future competition can be softened by letting the customer take an equity participation in the research unit. Vertical integration reduces the research unit's incentive to hold back the transfer of knowledge by reducing its payoff from having exclusive knowledge of the technology tomorrow. One can show, however, that integration imperils future technological progress (see Aghion and Tirole [1993] ).
Second, government promotion of R&D is one of the most important areas of public policy. Analyzing the government as a customer, an investor, or a benefactor (depending on the circumstances) ought to shed light on efficient ways of channeling government money into R&D.
Third, we have not considered competition among research teams. It would be fruitful to merge the property rights approach of this paper and of the literature on strategic vertical integration together with the traditional patent race analysis.
Last, we believe that our analysis provides some microfoundations for extending the new growth literature in several interesting directions. In particular, it may help to introduce financial and organizational considerations into the "neo-Schumpeterian" framework and also enrich our current views on technological innovation and diffusion within sectors and industries as major determinants of productivity growth.
APPENDIX: THE AMBIGUOUS EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE VALUE OF INNOVATION ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL FoRM
Example 1 (an Increase in VMakes RU Ownership More Desirable)
Suppose that the probability of discovery depends only on the research unit's effort: r(E) = ro > 0 for all E. Then ERU = Ec = 0. Suppose further that q(e) = 2e/Vo for 0 < e < 1, and q(e) = 2/Vo for e > 1. For V < V0, RU chooses e = 0 even under pure RU-ownership, since (2e/V0)(V/2) -e < 0 for all e > 0. Therefore, C prefers C-ownership to pure RU-ownership since r0V > rOV/2, and more generally to cofinancing. For V > Vo, C prefers RUownership to C-ownership if ro is sufficiently small, since (2/ V0) + ro)V12 > roV. Cofinancing then improves on RU-ownership, but can be made as small as possible by choosing V arbitrarily close to VO (any nonnegligible amount of equity taken by an investor then destroys RUs incentives). We thus conclude that at Vo the organizational form jumps from C-ownership to RU-ownership.
Example 2 (an Increase in VMakes C-Ownership More Desirable)
Assume that the customer's and the investor's investments are not substitutes. Indeed, the customer's investment is nonmonetary and noncontractible while investor's investment is useless. We posit that r(E) = 2RJE and q(e) = 2e/V0 for e < VO/4 and q(e) = 1/2 for e > Vo/4. We assume that V > V0.
Under C-ownership, the customer chooses E so as to maximize Thus, an increase in V makes C-ownership optimal at V = V*. Until now, we have ruled out cofinancing. As in example 1, having an investor take equity in RU (and give a lump sum payment to C) is optimal for C but cannot really be distinguished from pure RU-ownership if V is close to V0. Any nonnegligible equity of an investor in RU then destroys RU's incentives.
Last, note that at V = V*,pRU > pC. Therefore, an increase in V at V* discontinuously reduces the probability of discovery, while discontinuously raising the input E.
